Russian Security Strategy
Russia "became involved in the Syrian conflict to demonstrate its military capabilities and gain leverage with the West, this operation is peripheral to Russia’s main interests." Russia's main interest is the motherland itself. "But as you can tell from these maps, the key country for Russia after 1991 was Ukraine. The Baltics were beyond reach for now, and Belarus had a pro-Russian government. But either way, Ukraine was the key, because the Ukrainian border went through the agricultural heartland of Russia, as well as large population centers and transportation networks." This also meant that Russia needed to be "involved fighting Chechen insurgents on their side of the frontier, intervening in Georgia, sending troops to Armenia, and so on." Friedman ends, "With regard to the current battle over Ukraine, the Russians have to assume that the Euro-American interest in creating a pro-Western regime has a purpose beyond Ukraine. From the Russian point of view, not only have they lost a critical buffer zone, but Ukrainian forces hostile to Russia have moved toward the Russian border. It should be noted that the area that the Russians defend most heavily is the area just west of the Russian border, buying as much space as they can. The fact that this scenario leaves Russia in a precarious position means that the Russians are unlikely to leave the Ukrainian question where it is. Russia does not have the option of assuming that the West’s interest in the region comes from good intentions. At the same time, the West cannot assume that Russia—if it reclaims Ukraine—will stop there. Therefore, we are in the classic case where two forces assume the worst about each other. But Russia occupies the weaker position, having lost the first tier of the European Peninsula. It is struggling to maintain the physical integrity of the Motherland. Russia does not have the ability to project significant force because its naval force is bottled up and because you cannot support major forces from the air alone. Although it became involved in the Syrian conflict to demonstrate its military capabilities and gain leverage with the West, this operation is peripheral to Russia’s main interests. The primary issue is the western frontier and Ukraine. In the south, the focus is on the Caucasus. It is clear that Russia’s economy, based as it is on energy exports, is in serious trouble given the plummeting price of oil in the past year and a half. But Russia has always been in serious economic trouble. Its economy was catastrophic prior to World War II, but it won the war anyway… at a cost that few other countries could bear. Russia may be a landlocked and poor country, but it can nonetheless raise an army of loyal Spartans. Europe is wealthy and sophisticated, but its soldiers have complex souls. As for the Americans, they are far away and may choose not to get involved. This gives the Russians an opportunity. However bad their economy is at the moment, the simplicity of their geographic position in all respects gives them capabilities that can surprise their opponents and perhaps even make the Russians more dangerous." SideBar: About the USSR/Russia winning WWII, it is not clear they would have been successful without America support, and provision of massive amounts of arms, logistics elements, food, and fuel. America provided thousands of air planes, thousands of train cars, thousands of trucks and jeeps, fuel, munitions, and much else. Without these it is unclear whether the USSR would have been able to move its "loyal Spartans" to the battle front, fuel its tanks, American trucks, American Jeeps, American air craft, American munitions, and accordingly whether it could have continued fighting. Back to the point, Syria was always a sideshow for Putin, who needed a way to demonstrate its military capabilities. This was needed to keep the locals in check, and to give the Chechenyans, Georgians, Ukrainians, and the Baltic nations a graphic explanation of what could be in store. Add to this the fact that Russia is facing the same existential problem which triggered the collapse of the former Soviet Union (an oil price collapse), and one can see why Putin would only remain in Syria as long as was necessary to make his point. If oil prices had remained high Putin would have remained in Syria, teaching a tutorial on how to make a point. But the price collapsed, and Putin is faced with continuing security concerns in the Baltics, Georgia, Chechenya, Ukraine, as well as the collapsing Russian economy at home. And so, Putin came, bombed, and left, and in the end this short shrift of a campaign will make an impression, and likely one negative to the one intended. While this campaign did show Russian capability, it also showed that Russia lacks endurance. This could quite easily backfire on Putin, with the very problems he wishes to avoid rising up to challenge his resolve, and Russia's endurance. Only time will tell.
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These 7 maps explain US strategy
This is a simple, straightforward explanation of US security strategy from the revolution to the present. You really should read it all, it has a wealth of understanding, and it is written in an engaging readable style. Notice how our 21st century strategy is little more than a derivative of our Cold War strategy, leading us to continually act against our current interests. When you are done, head over to this article on Mapping Russia’s Strategy. Written by the same author, also with a wealth of understanding. Tomorrow Belongs To… Who?
"The far-right victories in Germany was powered by the votes of discontented youths, who abandoned the center-left as well as center right in droves." * * * "This should make all of Europe sit up and take notice: Europe has a lot of unemployed young people (France and Italy: 25% and 40% youth unemployment respectively). If they turn to the far-right to deal with their problems, the discontented youth population would provide a massive reservoir of energy for extremist parties. We’re not there yet, or anything like it, but it’s worth remembering what lies down the end of this road: the (literal) foot soldiers of the fascist movements of the 20s and 30s were discontented youths convinced that a new, post-democratic politics, with a heavy emphasis on solidarity, was the wave of the future." The other side of this equation is not stolid, staid, middle class Europe, it is the equally unemployed, and disaffected muslim youth living in hell hole Parisian Banlieue's, or something similar in other European countries. "The AfD aren’t the Nazis, and they aren’t overrunning Germany—yet. But if the crumbling liberal center of European politics wants to stave off an increasingly menacing series of right-wing threats, it will need to do the hard work to find answers for Europe’s struggling youth, and convince them of what was until recently blithely assumed: that the future still belongs to liberalism." This analysis is too simplistic. It leaves out the muslim youth completely, and it is they who will be driving this problem especially now that Europe had been inundated with a massive new, and more radicalized population of muslims. The clock ticks, Europe dithers, and the youth of Europe, both muslim, and non-muslim fester. Singing the sweet song of liberalism to the youth of Europe will do nothing. The non-Muslim youth don't believe this song anymore, and the Muslim youth don't accept or understand it. Europe must act, and quickly to save its soul. The clouds of the next great European war are forming, and if nothing is done to dissipate them, war will come. "Fascism, like communism, is an opportunistic infection of the body politic, one that occurs when the institutions — and officeholders — of liberal democracy are too corrupt, or too weak, or both, to sustain business as usual. If you don’t like this outcome, don’t be weak and corrupt." WHAT HATH MERKEL WROUGHT? What indeed! |
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